How Populist Parties Organize

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Abstract

This report explores the question of how populist parties organize and to what extent they have intrinsic characteristics and are alike in their organization. As this problematique is under-researched there is an important gap in our understanding and knowledge concerning populism and its parties. Largely a synthetic work, the report seeks to fill this void in existing research through an overview of the secondary literature and an inventory of scattered evidence covering a set of political parties broadly labelled populist. The evidence reveals that these parties in a range of European countries have experienced remarkably similar organizational attributes and style. A clear pattern has emerged. In a broad comparative perspective, three identifiable patterns are particularly notable as regards the organization of these parties. The first pattern is centralized organizational structures. The second pattern, and linked to the former, is personalized leadership, which is often but not always based on charismatic authority. The third pattern is factionalism or intra-party division.

Keywords: Factionalism; Leadership; Organization; Political Party; Populism; Radical Right

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# Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance)</td>
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<td>BZÖ</td>
<td>Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for Austria’s Future)</td>
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<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>DF</td>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party)</td>
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<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National (National Front) (Belgium and France)</td>
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<td>FN-MN</td>
<td>Front National – Mouvement National (National Front – National Movement)</td>
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<td>FrP</td>
<td>Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party) (Norway)</td>
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<td>FRP</td>
<td>Fremskridtspartiet (Progress Party) (Denmark)</td>
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<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party)</td>
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<td>LN</td>
<td>Lega Nord (Northern League)</td>
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<td>LPF</td>
<td>Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn)</td>
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<td>LPR</td>
<td>Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)</td>
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<td>LS-HZDS</td>
<td>Ľudová strana – Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia)</td>
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<td>MNR</td>
<td>Mouvement National Républicain (National Republican Movement)</td>
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<td>MSI</td>
<td>Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement)</td>
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<td>NyD</td>
<td>Ny Demokrati (New Democracy)</td>
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<td>Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>PdL</td>
<td>Il Popolo della Libertà (People of Freedom)</td>
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<td>SD</td>
<td>Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smer-SD</td>
<td>Smer – sociálna demokracia (Direction – Social Democracy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPR-RSČ</td>
<td>Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa (Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>Vlaams Block/Vlaams Belang (Flemish Block/Flemish Interest)</td>
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One of the most striking trends in contemporary European party politics has been the emergence and growth of populist political parties. It seems that no European country is immune to populism. The increase of populist political party formations justifies a closer look at this set of parties, to take stock and further the development of research on parties and populism, in its broadest sense.

The core of populism is hostility to representative politics (e.g. Canovan 1999; Taggart 2000; Mair 2002). Yet, populist parties have to find a role in such politics. In terms of representative democracy populist parties are faced with similar challenges to other political parties. To be able to fulfill representative functions, to govern and to act as channels or intermediaries between the state and the society, political parties need to organize themselves.

Regardless of which definitions of populism might be used, it is an empirical question to what extent its parties are alike. In this report I place the organizational factor at the centre of attention and analysis. Organization is understudied in research so far on populist parties. Whereas contributions on populist parties, notably on the right wing, overall, have primarily addressed demand-side factors, supply-side organizational factors have not been studied systematically. Such factors are important for populism’s political parties as well. Yet, organizational aspects remain underresearched. For one, Mudde (2007: 270), based on an overview of the few studies that exist, regrets the lack of research on how populist radical right parties are organized, including internal democracy: ‘Unfortunately, very

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1 See Rydgren (2007) for an overview of the research and literature on demand-centred versus supply-centred explanations of the emergence and electoral fortunes of (new) radical right populist parties. Among other factors, supply-side explanations focus on party organization.
little empirical research is available…’ Compared with the voluminous literature on other aspects of these parties, less has been written, systematically, on the organizational aspect, such as the internal structure of parties. As important as this topic would seem to be, there has been little research aimed at providing an answer to the question of what characterizes the organization of populist parties. What is clear is that a potentially fruitful line of research has been largely unexplored. This report seeks to fill part of this research gap.

The ultimate aim of my stock taking exercise and research endeavour is to gain further and cumulative knowledge of this set of parties, more specifically seeking to move us further in our ability to understand the organization of populist parties as dependent variable. To that end, this report explores, and is organized around, a number of guiding and interlinked research questions pertaining to the organizational commonality/variability, characteristics and distinctiveness of populism, whether it has its own form of organization: How should we expect populist parties to be organized? How are populist parties organized? What are their core organizational traits? To what extent are the populist parties alike?

To address these questions, the report offers an inventory of voluminous secondary sources and available evidence covering a broad set of parties in a range of European countries, designed to highlight and show how populist parties organize and for purposes of tracing a general pattern. In this vein, the study has an explorative and comparative approach.

Largely a synthetic work, I bring together and summarize scattered evidence of party organization in available existing research and secondary literature on political parties broadly labelled populist (e.g. Betz 1994; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Mény and Surel 2000, 2002; Taggart 1996, 2000; Rydgren and Widfeldt 2004; Frölich-Steffen and Rensmann 2005; Mudde 2007; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; de Lange 2008; Wysocka 2009). All in the cluster of parties included in this report have been classified as ‘populist’ by scholars in the field. However, some of the parties are more easily categorized as ‘populist’ than others. The cases are mainly West European. Populism has also been attributed to many political parties in

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2 Because of space limitations, this is not the place to dwell on various classifications or typologies. See, e.g., Taggart (2000), Mudde (2007) and de Lange (2008) and references therein.
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). For most of these ‘populist’ parties there is a lack of empirical research and we must still await secondary evidence.

The report discusses mainly the most important and well-known parties, particularly on the right, using them as examples or illustrations with a view to seeing whether parties classified as populist share similar organizational characteristics. Surely, these parties obviously are diverse and the question arises what exactly they do have in common. Below, I centre on general tendencies in the material, based on an overview of the literature.

The report proceeds in three steps. Firstly, on the basis of theory I discuss why we should expect populist parties to be organized in a particular way. Secondly, drawing on scattered evidence in the existing literature, I present the general record of a larger universe of cases, with particular attention to aspects of internal organizational structure of European populist parties. In the conclusion, finally, I summarize the report, identify key patterns and expand on the broader implications of the key findings in this report for existing and future research on populism and on party organization more generally, and in so doing identify areas in which additional work is most needed.
Theoretical expectations

Why should we expect populist parties to share distinct and common features in their organization and be different from other parties? The fundamental puzzle to be explained is why populists should embrace a particular form or mode of party organization. There is reason to expect populist parties to organize themselves in a different way to the parties in other party families. Populism can be understood in terms of ideology or style. These are interlinked and both may help to explain how its parties organize.

Party ideology may have a direct impact on party organization, notably among parties based on right-wing ideology and belief in strong leadership, strongman or one-man rule (see further in next section). Parties organized upon such right-wing ideology or doctrine can be expected to have centralized organization as well as authoritarian leadership, to be strongly dependent on their leaders, possibly relying on charismatic authority (e.g. Kitschelt 1995; Carter 2005).

More broadly, populists have a particular view of democracy and tend to reject established institutions. Regarding organizational form, the ambiguity of populism lies in its anti-establishment stance and the anti-institutional predisposition and politics of populism in general (Taggart 2000: 88). New populist parties therefore want to set themselves apart from other political parties also in organizational terms. As Taggart (1996: 37) emphasizes new populism, as an explicit form of protest, attempts to offer models of party that differ from prevailing models, notably the professional-bureaucratic party (see Panebianco 1988).

Challenging traditional party democracy, populist forces give voice to ‘anti-party sentiment’ (Mair 2002: 88). Insisting that they alone are the true voice of the people, populists are likely to disassociate themselves from
older/established parties and present themselves as an alternative to all other parties, claiming to be a new kind of party.

The anti-party tradition creates obstacles to organizational mobilization. Arguably, the ideology and style of populism, notably populists’ characteristic antipathy towards institutions, should lead them to attempt to construct ‘simple forms of organization’ (Taggart 2000: 103). For this reason we should expect that populist political parties in general will exhibit a greater propensity towards light organization and weaker institutionalization than other parties, particularly on the left. Moreover, the demands for an unmediated link between the leader and his/her followers point in the direction of centralization and personalization.

Based on theory, we can expect populist parties to be leadership-driven and essentially top-down organizations, with power concentrated in the hands of the leader or to a small leadership cadre. Insofar as individual political entrepreneurs establish these parties, and continue to drive the party, we can expect populist political party organizations to remain dominated by their leaders.

These parties are expected to have light or small organization, simple structure with few intermediating constraints on leadership, high level of centralization and dominance of the party leader and of the party in central office. Forming around a charismatic personality, populist parties may even be without a proper party organizational structure extending beyond the central office. But this is an empirical question.

These expectations are based on the fundamental insight that populist parties desire to make themselves different from established parties, leading populists to take a different approach to party organization building. If this theoretical logic correctly captures the characteristic features and the conditions under which these parties generally emerge and develop, I would expect these organizational traits and forms to be present in most cases and across countries.

With the theoretical expectations explored above in mind, we now turn to an examination of the organizational bases of populist parties, drawing on scattered evidence in the existing literature.

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3 In general, centre-right parties have not been noted for elaborate or well-developed party structures but rather for ‘light’ organization (Wilson 1998: 251; see also Enyedi and Linek 2008).
Is there a dominant, general, pattern in the ways in which populist political parties are organized? To address this question, this section offers an inventory of secondary evidence on populist parties, particularly on the right, in Europe, casting light on their experience and the extent to which they represent unique cases or being rather typical examples of a more widespread, cross-national phenomenon.

Does populism have a particular institutional form? Can a core set of organizational traits be attributed to populist parties? Zaslove (2008) contends that populism possesses a specific form of organization and that some organizational features can be attributed to its parties. He claims that populist parties have intrinsic characteristics and that it is possible to create an ideal type of populism. Seeking to move us further towards an ideal type of populism and its parties, Zaslove (2008: 324) suggests that this populist ideal type ‘includes specific organizational features. Here, I include a charismatic and populist leader who claims to possess a direct and unmediated relationship with the people; he (or she) is of the people and speaks for the people. This leads to a centralization of leadership and to a low level of party institutionalization.’ Does this hold true or is it rather an overgeneralization? This too needs to be examined.

When it comes to the (sub-) category of ‘extreme’ right parties – not all of which are ‘populist’ however – Carter (2005) offers important insights. Seeking to operationalize the causal link between organization and leadership on the one hand and party electoral success, Carter identifies different types of right-wing extremist party across Western Europe on the basis of a review of the internal structures and the leaderships of the different parties.
Drawing on the literature on right-wing extremism, and particularly the many single-party case studies, she examines the parties’ internal dynamics and structures and identifies different groups of (extreme right) parties broadly according to how well they are organized, how well they are led, and how disciplined and united they are. Categorizing the parties in such a way, Carter (2005: 66) thereby accounts for the degree of centralization in a party organization, the strength of the leadership, the level of discipline and the degree of dissent and factionalism within a party, all of which are ‘difficult factors to measure or quantify.’

Below, I will explore in more detail individual cases of parties broadly labelled populist and will seek to observe if they are alike in how they organize. To highlight the organizational aspects I empirically explore evidence on West European parties in particular, though available evidence is used from East European cases as well. The primary focus is on intraorganizational structures of the parties and their leadership, including centralization and the composition of leadership, rather than on their history or the broader context within which they emerge and evolve. Following Carter, I systematize into three dimensions: organization, leadership, and factionalism.

Organization

Political parties must be understood as the organizations they are (Panebianco 1988). Political parties go through different stages of party building. Institutionalization enables organizations to survive. Political party organizations that survive, and most actually do, are weakly or strongly institutionalized.

Political parties are adaptive organizations. Political party organizational development can be examined by looking into adaptive processes of and within parties. Political parties have to be disaggregated insofar as they cannot be understood as unitary actors. Mair (1994: 4) distinguishes between three different ‘faces’ or interactive elements of party organizations. The first of these faces is the party in public office, that is, the party organization in parliament and in government. The second face is the party on the ground, that is, the membership organization and, potentially, also the loyal
party voters. The third face is the *party in central office*. The focus of this study is on the party in central office, that is, the central party organization-
al level.

In a more narrow sense, party organization refers to the different internal organizational structures of a political party. Intraparty organs and the relations between them are key objects of analysis and dimensions in the study of party organization, in relation to the degree of power concentration within a party and its centralization (e.g. Katz and Mair 1994; Johansson 2005).

There is no exact definition to the question of what is meant by a well-organized political party. Mudde (2007: 267) asks ‘what constitutes a well-organized (populist radical right) political party?’ But he offers no answer.

As far as populist parties are concerned there appears to be almost universal agreement in existing empirical studies that these parties have centralized organizational structure. Whereas Mudde (2007: 270) emphasizes that populist radical right parties do not all have the same organizational structure, he notes that ‘the few studies that do exist mostly confirm a strong authoritarian and centralist party structure…’ In this connection, he refers to the thorough analysis by DeClair (1999) on the French National Front (FN) and to a study by Segert (2005) on a party in the Czech Republic (see further below). Indeed, Segert (2005: 192) notes that right-wing populist parties as a rule are characterized by a strictly hierarchical organization.

Turning now to individual cases I begin with the French FN, the best-studied and best-known far/extreme/radical right populist political party. It clearly features a centralized organization. Initially a loose association of extreme right networks, FN under Jean-Marie Le Pen grew into a model of a hierarchically structured, disciplined, and strong party. Its internal life ‘evokes strong parallels’ with the Leninist democratic centralism of the French Communists (Marcus 1995: 28, 47), and within ‘old-style’ Communist parties in general (DeClair 1999: 159). Accordingly, Marcus (1995: 47) notes that FN closely became, in practice, ‘a highly centralised machine with a strong, pyramid-like organisation. Power is held at the top and Le

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4 As with other cases, more has been written about the history of the party and the broader context within which it has thrived than about intraorganizational aspects. Yet, regarding its party organization, and its leadership, DeClair (1999), drawing upon own elite interviews with primary decision makers of the party, offers detailed information.
Pen dominates its internal life.’ Internal democracy within the party was ‘imperfect and infrequent at best’ (Marcus 1995: 46). Likewise, DeClair (1999: 158–9) emphasizes the ‘pyramid structure’ of the internal organization and notes that the party organization emerged into ‘a hierarchically structured edifice that controls decision making in a top-down manner…’ FN remained ‘highly centralized’ (Ellinas 2010: 180).

Regarding the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), its organizational structure and internal dynamics has been a largely neglected dimension (Luther 2003: 191). But students and commentators paint a picture of a centralized as well as personalized party, in which power and internal decision-making processes have been highly centralized, or even authoritarian. Jörg Haider, who took over leadership in 1986, built up a ‘strong’ party organization in which he exerted control and on which he could depend (Carter 2005: 86). Repeated electoral success from 1986 onward led to organizational and membership growth. Organizationally, the party underwent considerable centralization and professionalization (Luther 2000: 429). Haider shaped the organizational structure of the FPÖ into ‘an increasingly centralized populist party’ (Heinisch 2008: 79; see also Luther 2000: 434; Carter 2005: 86; Ellinas 2010: 60).

A similar situation applies to the strongly organized Flemish Block/Interest (VB), in which the organizational structure and power is ‘centralized’ (Husbands 1992: 138; Carter 2005: 88). The approach of centralization ‘stresses the unity of the leadership, ensures control, and encourages effective action’ (Swyngedouw 1998: 61). According to Swyngedouw (2000: 135), the party was organized ‘in a Stalinist-like way, promoting small, active core groups in different neighbourhoods and with specialized branches…’ Internal democracy is ‘very limited’ within the VB (Carter 2005: 88). As Mudde (2007: 270) notes ‘different authors have shown that both formally and informally it is the least internally democratic of all major Flemish political parties…’ According to Coffé (2005: 91), the VB ‘is an efficiently structured, well-organized party... This is partly due to the existence of a traditionally well-organized nationalist subculture.’

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5 Luther (2000: 433–5) describes the internal life and structure of the FPÖ. See also Luther (1997, 2003) and Heinisch (2008: 78–9).

6 The VB is an example of the parties ‘that possessed strong organizations before they achieved electoral success’ (Art 2008: 422).
VB has benefited from the organizational experience and resources of the old Flemish (mainstream) nationalist movement into which the postwar far right in Flanders was incorporated (Art 2008: 421). VB emerged from a dense network of far right organizations that were historically rooted in Flemish society (Art 2008: 430).

Unlike the (more successful) VB in neighbouring Flanders, the francophone FN in Wallonia has not enjoyed the same pre-existing organizational resources (Art 2008: 430). Art (2008: 422) notes that Wallonia, in contrast to Flanders, never possessed a strong nationalist subculture and that the radical right FN when it was founded in 1985 ‘was built largely from right-wing extremist elements that were unable, and indeed often unwilling, to build a functioning party organization.’ When it emerged in the 1980s the party had little in the way of organizational resources on which to draw (Swyngedouw 1998: 59; Art 2006: 34). From the beginning, the party had no structured organization and its party organization was ‘little more than an ad hoc collection of individuals of quite divergent natures’ (Swyngedouw 1998: 59; see also Coffé 2005: 78). In sum, the party has suffered from ‘its poor organization and lack of leaders, members and organizational background’ (Coffé 2005: 90).

In the Netherlands, the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), formed ahead of the 2002 general election the same year, proved to be something of a ‘flash’ party phenomenon. As Art (2006: 34) notes, ‘the lack of a party organization contributed mightily to its rapid decline…’ Following the violent death of its leader, Pim Fortuyn, and its entry into the coalition government, the party ‘rapidly disintegrated’ (Lucardie 2008: 151). At the time of the elections in 2002 the party lacked ‘any real party organization’ (van der Brug and Mughan 2007: 43). In May 2002 the organization of the LPF ‘was really not much more than an executive committee, with a small office, a secretary and a handful of regional volunteers’ (Lucardie 2008: 160). According to Lucardie (2008: 160), Fortuyn ‘personally selected the candidates for his list, with the help of one executive committee member.’ Under Fortuyn, it was clearly a centralized party.

In Italy we find the model of Führerpartei – the Italian Social Movement (MSI). We are dealing here with ‘a highly centralized and vertically aligned party’ (Ignazi 1998: 166). Power was concentrated to the party secretary, the leader. In the MSI, like its offspring National Alliance (AN),
similar to the French FN, ‘the dominant coalition is expressed by a single leader who exercises an overwhelming influence’ (Ignazi and Ysmal 1998: 300). Gianfranco Fini, who was elected leader in 1987, ‘gained full control of the party’ and led the transformation from MSI to AN (Ignazi 1998: 172). Ignazi (1998: 173) observes that the ‘organizational features changed to a limited extent.’ The ‘Caesarist-centrist traits’ were maintained and ‘power is concentrated in the hands of the president’ (Ignazi 1998: 173). Within the AN ‘dominant coalition’, according to Ignazi (1998: 174), the president ‘is a sort of absolute king.’ Ignazi and Ysmal (1998: 291) note that the move from MSI to AN ‘has strengthened the concentration of power in the hands of the leadership: it now nominates the National Executive body, depriving party members of a substantial amount of power.’ Ignazi (2003/2006: 50) emphasizes the rather ‘bonapartistic’ decision-making process and that the party leader ‘has full control of the party’, which has replaced the mass-party model on which the party was built with a ‘highly personalized, hyper-centralized party, moulded on the Führerprinzip…’ AN also was strongly and well organized (Carter 2005: 80, 83).

Another Italian case is the separatist party Northern League (LN). This is a strongly organized party and ‘a further party that displays a structured organization’, which is ‘tightly structured and centralized’ (Carter 2005: 89). Betz (1998: 49–50) notes that the organizational structure of the LN ‘has been geared towards two objectives: first, to reflect the federalist nature of the movement; and second, to guarantee organizational and ideological cohesion and prevent fractionalization that might weaken the movement.’ We are clearly dealing here with a centralized party. Betz (1998: 50) further notes that the ‘organizational structure of the Lega Nord resembles a pyramid.’ The (then) party leader, Umberto Bossi, himself characterized the party’s decision-making process as one of democratic centralism, which

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7 More generally in southern Europe, according to Ignazi and Ysmal (1998: 299–300), parties left or right and ‘extreme’ right parties such as MSI ‘pay homage to the rites of internal formal Democracy and therefore leave a role (or the appearance of a role) to the membership. But in reality the control is highly concentrated in the hands of a dominant coalition.’

8 In 2009, Fini merged his party, the AN, with Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia to form the People of Freedom (PdL) party. Seemingly, Berlusconi continued to pull the strings and wield control over the new combined party. In the end, in summer 2010, Fini and his allies broke away from PdL to form a separate parliamentary faction. In November 2013, Berlusconi renamed the PdL party Forza Italia.
has led some observers to characterize the LN as a Leninist party (Betz 1998: 50). By the late 1990s, according to Betz (1998: 50), ‘despite the fact that structurally the party has become more democratic than it was in the 1980s, Bossi is still largely in control.’ Those challenging Bossi’s leadership or deviating from the party line ‘were either forced to resign or resigned on their own’ (Betz 1998: 51). As Ignazi (2003/2006: 57–8) argues the LN ‘is totally dominated by its leader’ and even the various splits that occurred throughout 1999 did not affect him. Dominating the party entirely, Bossi was ‘able to impose his will upon the organization…’ (Carter 2005: 90). Bossi was clearly supreme in the LN, whose success can be largely attributed to him, leaving questions open about life after him.

In Scandinavia the Progress parties in Denmark and Norway emerged in the 1970s as (new) ‘protest parties’ and as such were certainly different from other parties in their general orientation. The party founders, Mogens Glistrup and Anders Lange, respectively, clearly wanted to disassociate their new party from the established parties. Both of them ‘had been as adamantly opposed to a regular party’ (Svåsand 1998: 81). Viewing politics as dominated by a political class and the established political parties’ organizations, they therefore sought to avoid the development of a permanent hierarchical organization and instead rely on a ‘spontaneous movement,’ led by Glistrup and Lange themselves (Svåsand 1998: 78). This conforms closely to our expectations of how a populist party should like to present and organize itself. But especially the Norwegian party has changed with the times. By way of comparison, it has been more concerned about being seen as a standard kind of party.

The Danish FRP had a more relaxed approach to organization, with understatement. Over time, the party developed an organization but still carried ‘a populist legacy’ (Andersen 1992: 195; see also Svåsand 1998: 80). This included a membership of few and a charismatic style of leadership (see further below). In brief, the party failed to build a robust organization. Today, it is a marginal player in the shadow of the Danish People’s Party (DF). This party, a splinter party, has been regarded as ‘well institutionalized’ (Andersen and Bjørklund 2000: 219). It clearly is a centralized and top-steered party with limited internal democracy, in as well as out of parliament (Sommer and Aagaard 2003). While built as a membership organization – thereby following the organizational strategy of established parties
– its ‘party members are not granted any political influence; the party leadership decides on the policies’ (Pedersen 2006).

Initially, the Norwegian FrP also had little in the way of organization. But under Carl I. Hagen it underwent organizational development and professionalization. He worked to streamline the party’s organization. Since 1978, Hagen occupied the dual position of party and parliamentary chair. He took control of the party and its organization. Hagen was strengthened by the party’s electoral success in 1989 and the ensuing radical organizational change (Svåsand 1998: 81). In 1990, the parliamentary group became completely subordinated to the party (Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 257). A process of centralization followed. In 1991, the party undertook an organizational strategy emphasizing that all members and units in the party were required to implement decisions taken at the central level. According to Svåsand and Wörlund (2005: 257), these changes over time have made FrP ‘the most centralized party in Norway.’ At the same time, party growth resulted in organizational problems (Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 258), and in tensions within (see further below). The centralization in the party was a response to internal conflicts (Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 260). According to Svåsand (1998: 81), ‘the lower echelons of the party were characterized by a high degree of turbulence and conflicts, in which the central party leadership had to, or tried to, intervene.’ In sum, the party underwent continuing ‘institutionalization’ (Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 265).

It is also worth noting that parties like the Norwegian FrP and Sweden’s New Democracy (NyD) could be called ‘entrepreneurial parties’, organizations growing up around the initiative of single individuals (Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 254; see also Taggart 1996: 181). In this way these parties are examples of the ‘business firm’ model of party organization (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999: 323).

NyD illustrates the dilemma that faces the party organization of populism at different levels: ‘how to differentiate itself from other parties while at the same time emulating them enough to ensure organisational-electoral survival’ (Taggart 1996: 137–8).9 Unlike the FrP in Norway, Sweden’s NyD proved to be a ‘flash’ party phenomenon (e.g. Rydgren 2002, 2006; Art 2006). NyD did not undergo institutionalization (Svåsand 1998: 77). It

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9 Taggart (1996: 121–9) describes the party organization of NyD in detail. See also Rydgren (2006).
was practically without any organizational apparatus worth the name. Instead of building the local party apparatus, like FrP did in Norway, NyD chose a different strategy. Its leaders exerted ‘extremely authoritarian rule’ over the rest of the party organization, which lacked ‘internal democracy’ (Rydgren 2009: 18; see also Taggart 1996: 122; Svåsand 1998: 82; Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 260). NyD was ‘extremely hierarchical’ in its power structure and ‘authoritarian’ (Rydgren 2006: 62, 64). Taggart (1996: 181) concludes that a party organization such as the one formed by NyD ‘celebrates leadership and is strongly centralised.’ In fact, authority was centralized throughout the party organization. The centralization in the party was a response to internal conflicts (similar to those in the Norwegian FrP). Centralization was meant to keep leadership control of what the party’s representatives stood for (Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 260). In sum, NyD was a weakly organized party. Failing to organize and institutionalize, NyD collapsed, while populist radical right parties elsewhere thrived, for example in neighbouring Norway. In Sweden, therefore, NyD clearly set a negative example, reminding others of the need for organization building and organizational capacity as a means for survival. This is clearly a lesson drawn by Sweden’s main radical right populist party today, the Sweden Democrats (SD).

SD has, in West European comparative perspective, been classified among extreme right parties that are ‘weakly organized’ (Carter 2005: 67). SD has not been known for organizational strength, rather the contrary. Throughout its existence the party, which was founded in 1988, has experienced organizational problems. The party made efforts to build an organization in the 1990s and there was a proposal for a very hierarchical structure reminding of the type of party organization characteristic of Nazi parties, both in the past and contemporary ones (Lodenius and Larsson 1994: 46). The aim was to build a strong, national party winning votes in general elections, but to a large extent the party has attracted sympathizers with little or no experience of subordinating themselves to an organization (Lodenius and Larsson 1994: 55). The party organization was loose and

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10 Like elsewhere party organization is under-researched compared to other aspects. Organizational factors instead are central in Rydgren (2009) but mainly as an independent variable explaining electoral fate or the ‘relative failure’ of Swedish radical right parties including SD and NyD.
without a solid structure and therefore the party depended on key persons completely dominating the work of the party (Ibid). In other words, the party was weakly institutionalized. However, the SD underwent an important transformation in the mid-1990s and again in the 2000s as it sought to break with the extremist tradition and refashion for itself a new image as a more mainstream and mature party capable of holding public office. The process has involved attempts to normalizing the organizational apparatus of the party. In the early 2000s, the party engaged in organization building. It appears as if this was a process steered from the centre. Existing evidence shows the centralization of the party. There emerges a picture of a ‘top-steered’ and undemocratic party (Slätt 2004), run by an inner circle around the party leader, the so-called ‘bunker gang’ at the party headquarters (Slätt 2004: 11, 32). The party organization remains ‘top-steered’ under the present leadership. Internal democracy ‘is still highly limited’ (Rydgren 2009: 29; see also Lodenius and Wingborg 2009: 16–8). To strengthen the party, the new leadership elected in 2005 has given priority to organizational issues and capacity building, to developing a professional and effective party organization (Widfeldt 2007: 13; Lodenius 2009: 14: Mattsson 2009: 11, 55). The party has clearly been in need of stronger organization and organizational coherence. It has been engaged in establishing local and regional organizations across the country (Widfeldt 2007: 13; Rydgren 2009: 28, 37–8, n. 7). Strengthened electoral performance boosted its access to financial, organizational, and communication resources, making SD better able to sustain the organization and to shape its own fate. In brief, the contemporary situation is considerably different from the 1990s. Today’s SD clearly has a much stronger party organization than previously. The level of organizational sophistication has increased. Since 2005 there has been a strengthening of both the organization and the leadership (see further below). The new leadership elected that year gradually seized control of the party and made efforts to centralize authority. In summary, the SD can be regarded as a centralized party.

When it comes to CEE, many of the newly created parties, like populist ones, tended to emerge in a top-down manner (van Biezen and Mair 2006: 105), and to remain centralized (Enyedi 2006: 234). We find political parties broadly labelled populist among the first ones established in a post-communist context. An example is the Czech party of the right-wing popu-
list Republicans.\textsuperscript{11} Its organizational structure has been characterized as strongly centralized with a hierarchical organization structured around the party chairman (Miroslav Sládek) (Segert 2005: 193). In Slovakia we find centre-left (Direction – Social Democracy, Smer-SD) as well as right-wing nationalist (Slovak National Party, SNS, and People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, LS-HZDS) populist parties, all three of which formed government after the 2006 election. Typically for a populist party HZDS, under Vladimír Meciar, has been noted for its movement character and ‘Führerprinzip’, dominated by a leader on top and with a hierarchical and by no means democratic structure (Kneuer 2005: 157). The party, known for its clientelistic structures, underwent centralization. Except for Meciar, the term populist has been linked to the Smer leader Robert Fico. He founded Smer, a centre-left populist party, in 1999 (Kneuer 2005: 166). According to Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2008: 16), the party ‘began life as one person’s project and despite some evidence of party building’, in 2004, ‘the party organization remains dominated by the party leader Robert Fico.’ They conclude that parties in Slovakia more generally, and elsewhere, have ‘highly-centralized and non-institutionalized party organizations’ (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2008: 32). To a varying extent, a similar situation applies to most parties in CEE, such as Poland’s populist parties Self-Defence (SO) and League of Polish Families (LPR), both strongly leader-driven.\textsuperscript{12} SO emerged as a ‘movement’, being a trade union as well as a party (Wysocka 2009: 151, 173). In 2001, the year of its victory, the party’s organization changed and there was ‘a strengthening of its structures…’ (Wysocka 2009: 153). But while enjoying success, ‘weakness was visible in the party organization.’ LPR is based on the youth organization All-Polish Youth, with a ‘hierarchical’ structure (Wysocka 2009: 193). This is from where the former party leader, Roman Giertych, originates politically (Wysocka 2009: 198).

To summarize, the picture is clear. There is a dominant, general pattern of centralized parties. Obviously, the nature of party organization may to a significant extent be explained by the role of leadership. Asking why some

\textsuperscript{11} Originally named the Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, SPR-RSC, founded in 1989/1990, splintered after the defeat in 1998.

\textsuperscript{12} The same could be said of Law and Justice, the party of Jaroslaw and (the late) Lech Kaczynski. However, I consider this party to be national conservative rather than populist.
populist radical right parties have strong organizations while others do not, Mudde (2007: 271–2) writes that this is not an easy question to answer, adding: ‘Without any doubt, the person of the leader plays an important role.’ He further notes that these are ‘usually younger organizations and (thus) less institutionalized than established parties, rendering them more dependent upon one or a few individuals…’ (Mudde 2007: 273). Hence, organization and leadership are closely linked to each other. It is to leadership we shall now turn, with particular focus on whether and the extent to which party leaders are held to be charismatic.

Leadership

Regarding leadership, we should expect populist parties to have less collegial decision-making than other parties and to be dominated by their leaders who for example control key nominations to internal party bodies and make the key decisions regarding party policy. As indicated above, available empirical evidence from a broad set of European cases suggests a general pattern of centralized and personalized rather than collective leadership.

Concerning the (populist) extreme right, Ignazi (2003/2006: 30) notes that ‘personalization’ is a feature these parties bring ‘to the highest point with a mix of Führerprinzip and charismatic appeal…’ In a similar vein, Mudde (2007: 260) observes that whereas increased centralization of power and personalization of leadership have been noted for contemporary political parties in general, ‘these processes are believed to be even more extremely pronounced in the case of the populist radical right party family. Several authors refer to “charismatic leaders”… or even “Führer” and “Führerparteien”…’

The authority of the party leader is clear in the case of the French FN in which leadership has been highly centralized and personalized under Jean-Marie Le Pen, a self-proclaimed ‘populist’. Given the fractious history and nature of the French far right there was a need for a strong leader. Significantly, in the early years of the party in the 1970s other leading activists saw a strengthening of Le Pen’s hand inside the FN and protested against his ‘methods’ and dictatorship and one of them (Alain Robert) ‘recalled the
principle of collegial leadership against the *führerprinzip*’ (Hainsworth 1992: 37). Organizational changes from the 1980s and onward further empowered the leader. Power was concentrated to Le Pen and a small leadership cadre around him (e.g. Marcus 1995: passim; Ignazi and Ysmal 1998: 300; Ivaldi 1998: passim; DeClair 1999: passim). As Marcus (1995: 28) notes in the FN there was ‘almost a cult of personality centred on Le Pen; his face and name are everywhere.’ Students of the FN emphasize Le Pen’s charismatic personality and leadership style (e.g. Ignazi and Ysmal 1998: 294, 300; Ivaldi 1998: 51–2; DeClair 1999: 163, 213; Carter 2005: 83; Rydgren 2008: 179). According to DeClair (1999: 215), the dependence on the leader in the case of the FN ‘follows a rather general pattern for parties of the far right; historically, such parties have tended to coalesce around authoritarian leaders…’ He points to similar patterns of charismatic leadership in the Austrian, Belgian/Flemish, and Italian contemporary far right. Like the French FN, these parties have clearly displayed a tendency toward personalized leadership. Immediately below, we turn attention to these parties.

The organizational apparatus of Austria’s FPÖ ensured the party leadership a considerable degree of discretion (Luther 2000: 441, 2003: 210; Heinisch 2008: 78). Based on the *Führerprinzip*, strong leadership has been the norm in the FPÖ. *Führer*-party – that is how the FPÖ is usually depicted (e.g. Ellinas 2010: 60). Heinisch (2008: 78) notes that authoritarian leadership has been an operational principle of the party. He further notes that the ‘excessive personalization’ is one of the ‘populist characteristics’ of the FPÖ (Heinisch 2008: 82). Heinisch (2008: 83) argues that it is ‘unlikely that any single political figure [in the FPÖ] will become as dominant as Jörg Haider was at the zenith of his power.’ Similar to Le Pen, Haider adopted a personalized style of leadership rather than collegial. The FPÖ too had a charismatic leader in Haider (e.g. DeClair 1999: 195). Carter (2005: 86) even suggests that Haider ‘displayed immense charisma.’ Under Haider’s leadership, from 1986 onward, the party became more centralized as well as personalized. As we have seen, Haider took control of the party and extended his power within the party as the trend towards centralization was further strengthened in the 1990s. This trend was reinforced by institutional changes within the party, notably through organizational innovations such as the ‘leader’s office’ (Luther 2000: 434; see also Ellinas 2010: 60).
The cult of obedience reached its peak in 1998 with the pledge of loyalty dubbed the ‘Contract of Democracy’, which Haider demanded all party officials to sign (Heinisch 2008: 79). Since the departure of Haider the leadership of the party seems to have become more collective in nature, under successive party leaders.\textsuperscript{13} In any event, under Haider’s leadership the FPÖ was a strongly personalized party.

Likewise, centralized and personalized leadership characterizes the Flemish VB. Strong leadership has been the norm. Arguably, the VB had a ‘charismatic’ leader in Filip Dewinter (Swyngedouw 1998: 62; Carter 2005: 88; Coffé 2005: 91). However, Karel Dillen, the party founder and its chairman until 1996, had not the ‘charisma’ of Le Pen and Haider (Carter 2005: 89), or was even ‘uncharismatic’ (Swyngedouw 1998: 62). But whereas several of its leading members showed ‘obvious competence’ Dillen stood ‘supreme above his peers’ (Husbands 1992: 138–9). Although centralized the VB, unlike other ‘extreme-right parties’, has not been a ‘one-person band’ but has had qualified people in leadership and elected offices (Husbands 1992: 138). Mudde (2007: 270) notes that VB, a case among the more successful populist radical right parties, is a party with ‘several strong leadership figures…’ In contrast to VB, the Wallonian FN has been a poorly led party. Its leader and creator Daniel Féret ‘can hardly be described as charismatic’, according to Mudde (2007: 261).

In neighbouring Netherlands, Pim Fortuyn had the image of being highly charismatic (van der Brug and Mughan 2007: 43–4). Fortuyn no doubt had ‘charisma’ (Lucardie 2008: 157). But as we have seen it proved a ‘flash’ party phenomenon, with a weak organization and unable to survive the death of its founder and leader.

In Italy, Gianfranco Fini, who was elected leader in 1987 and subsequently led the transformation of MSI into AN, ‘proved to be an authoritative and charismatic figure and has displayed considerable political skill’ (Carter 2005: 83). In addition to statutory provisions, ‘the uncontested dominance and charismatic-like aura of the leadership introduced traits of “führer-princip” in AN’ (Ignazi 1998: 174). Ignazi and Ysmal (1998: 293) note that when parties have to cope with recognized and long-lived factions (see further below), such as in the MSI, ‘entrepreneurial’ leaders and sub-

\textsuperscript{13} In May 2000, Haider resigned the party leadership in favour of Susanne Riess-Passer, who was later replaced as leader by Heinz-Christian Strache.
leaders try and generally succeed in establishing their dominance. Since the party ‘was highly factionalized, the access to the top levels of party hierarchy involved a strong degree of conflict. Since the 1970s, those conflicts have been managed by the leadership, thanks to the increasing power of the General Secretary which increasingly freed itself from the control of the National Executive (to the point that, since 1995, the AN leader nominates the National Executive’) (Ignazi and Ysmal 1998: 293).

In Italy’s LN, Bossi displayed ‘charismatic and authoritarian leadership’ (Carter 2005: 90; see also Betz 1998: 50–1; Ignazi 2003/2006: 57–8). As was noted above, ‘democratic centralism’ and tight control over the party was a characteristic feature of LN under Bossi.

In Denmark, the founder and leader of the Progress Party (FRP), Mogens Glistrup, a maverick personality, can be characterized as a charismatic leader. According to Andersen (1992: 195), Glistrup was charismatic and unashamedly populist in style. In its earlier phase, at least, the FRP ‘could certainly be defined as a charismatic party, in which the leader had absolute power…’ (Ignazi 2003/2006: 143). As far as DF is concerned, Mudde (2007: 261) counts it among the (moderately) successful populist radical right parties that have not always been led by ‘charismatic’ personalities, noting that its leader Pia Kjærsgaard ‘can hardly be described as charismatic…’ But she is usually regarded as ‘charismatic’, however. In any event, Kjærsgaard showed herself to be an able leader (Widfeldt 2000: 490; Carter 2005: 91). She dominated the party. Especially during the first couple of years she was the party and ‘kept the rest of the party in a very short leash with the support of a few trusted fellow politicians and party bureaucrats’ (Pedersen 2006; see also Sommer and Aagaard 2003).

As with DF leadership quality is ‘a key factor’ behind the success of the Norwegian FrP (Widfeldt 2000: 490; see also Carter 2005: 80; Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 278). The leadership of Carl I. Hagen, who became party leader in 1978, contributed to ‘consolidation’ of the party (Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 276). Throughout the struggles within the party Hagen ‘remained in firm control of his party…’ (Carter 2005: 81). Reportedly, there have been many stories about Hagen’s authoritarian tendencies (Marsdal 2008: 78). He has been regarded as a ‘charismatic’ leader (Ravik Jupskås 2009: 65). Like Hagen, the new party chair, Siv Jensen, has also proved an able leader.
In contrast, Sweden’s NyD suffered from intense leadership problems (Svåsand 1998: 90; Widfeldt 2000: 49; Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 261; Rydgren 2006: ch. 4; Rydgren 2009: 21, 37, n. 4). As we have seen, NyD was a centralized party under authoritarian rule, controlled from the top down. This is another party characterized by personalized, in the extreme, and charismatic leadership, fitting ‘the model of a charismatic party’ (Taggart 1996: 136; see also Rydgren 2006: 64, 2009: 15). Both its leaders are regarded as ‘charismatic’ individuals (Taggart 1996: 127; Rydgren 2009: 37, n. 4).

So far, we have noted an almost similar pattern of charismatic leadership. SD, however, is a conspicuous exception to this rule. Compared to other parties dealt with here, SD’s leaders have not possessed the same charismatic personality traits, refuting the standard hypothesis that leaders of populist political parties are charismatic and that this even is a precondition for electoral success. According to a close observer of the party, SD has always lacked a charismatic leader (Lodenius 2009: 38; see also Larsson and Ekman 2001: 167; Slätt 2004: 54). The present leader, Jimmie Åkesson, cannot be considered charismatic. Rather than personalized and individual, leadership appears to be collective to a certain extent.

An observer of right-wing populist parties in CEE notes that these parties as a rule rely on a charismatic party leader (Segert 2005: 192). Slovakia’s populist parties illustrate this tendency, notably HZDS. Meciar, the party’s founder, was the charismatic leader on top and dominated the hierarchical and by no means democratically structured HZDS (Kneuer 2005: 157). Regarding the SNS, it has ‘sharply increased its degree of unmediated leadership’, whereas on the whole ‘the surviving parties have not fundamentally changed their leadership structures over time’ (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2008: 29, n. 14). In Slovakia we also find the populist centre-left Smer party, whose leader Robert Fico is described as charismatic (Kneuer 2005: 166). Elsewhere in CEE, Poland’s SO and LPR have been strongly leader-driven, as already noted. The Polish case arguably ‘demonstrates that populism must be based on a strong and charismatic leader’ (Wysocka 2009: 302). SO is a prominent example of a ‘charismatic party’. Its controversial founder and leader, Andrzej Lepper, has been regarded as charismatic. According to Wysocka (2009: 172, see also pp. 14, 302), Lepper provides a textbook example of ‘a charismatic leader’, and of a populist
when presenting himself as the only ‘authentic’ politician, insisting on being a man of the people and fighting against all those who were against his ‘heartland’. He adopted ‘autocratic style of leadership’ (Wysocka 2009: 153). LPR elected Roman Giertych as the new party chairman at the party congress in January 2003 upon which a ‘single leadership emerged’ (Wysocka 2009: 178).\(^{14}\) Wysocka (2009: 201) notes his ‘charisma’ and that he, for party members, has been a ‘charismatic person’. But compared to SO’s Lepper the ‘role of the charismatic leader is not so explicit in the case of the League’ (Wysocka 2009: 202, see also p. 302).\(^{15}\) Whereas a single leader emerged, there had arguably been a ‘triumvirate’ of leaders before (Wysocka 2009: 178).

More generally in CEE, there is a pattern of personalized leadership. As Mudde (2007: 261, n. 2) notes ‘party leaders play a more important role in the less institutionalized party politics of postcommunist Europe than in the fairly stable party politics of the Western World.’ Parties tend to be based on personalities rather than on ideological convictions or party programmes (Jungerstam-Mulders 2006). In elections, individual politicians often have greater importance than party platforms. Arguably, party politics tends to be highly personalized and party leaderships predominant (Enyedi 2006: 234; van Biezen and Mair 2006: 107). But the same could be said of parties in Western Europe, such as the Gaullist party in France and Berlusconi’s Forza Italia that have also been strongly personality-based.\(^{16}\)

**Factionalism**

Although leader-driven and personality-based at least radical right populist parties are known to be factious. Infighting is to be expected in those parties bringing together right-wing ‘extremists’. And even in parties founded

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\(^{14}\) Following the election defeat of the LPR in 2007, Giertych resigned as party leader but remained a member of the party (Wysocka 2009: 308).

\(^{15}\) Indeed, Mudde (2007: 261) counts the LPR among the (moderately) successful populist radical right parties that have not (always) been led by ‘charismatic’ personalities, suggesting that its leader Roman Giertych ‘can hardly be described as charismatic…’

\(^{16}\) As Hopkin and Paolucci (1999: 323) note Forza Italia’s genetic model reveals a ‘characteristic trait of the business firm party: a high degree of centralisation of power around the party leader.’
on the *Führer-prinzip* there can be conflict and power struggles over ideology and policy as well as leadership. As a result, parties may experience defections and splits.

The far right has a factious history, in France and elsewhere. Several students of these parties emphasize the tendency toward factionalism within these parties (e.g. Marcus 2000: 35; Taggart 2000: 87; Carter 2005: 66, 77). Examples include FRP in Denmark, in which Mogens Glistrup ‘effectively saw his party effectively push him out’ as a result of a leadership challenge by Pia Kjærsgaard, Sweden’s NyD in which differences between its leadership duo (Bert Karlsson and Ian Wachtmeister) ‘led to both factionalism and eventually to the party’s demise’, and even the French FN, which was subject to ‘a divisive and damaging challenge from within…’ (Taggart 2000: 87). This was when former FN general delegate and number two in the party Bruno Mégrret attempted to establish himself as leader of the French far right in 1998 and 1999. Under him, a breakaway faction established the National Front – National Movement (FN-MN) as a new rival (splinter) party to the National Front, still under the stewardship of Le Pen.17

Despite its strong centralization and leadership, the French FN has certainly not been immune to factionalism. On the contrary, the party has experienced factionalism and a number of splits (Marcus 1995: passim; DeClair 1999: passim). FN has been beset by internal power conflicts and personal conflicts (Ivaldi 1998: 61; see also Hainsworth 1992: 38, 2000: 29). Despite the centralization of authority, FN is known to be a factionalized party.

A similar pattern is evident in other cases, including FPÖ, which, like other parties of this type, ‘has been subject to internal dissent and factionalism’ (Carter 2005: 85; see also Luther 2000, 2003; Heinisch 2008). The FPÖ underwent a split in 1993 when the liberal wing of the party finally departed, led by the party’s former general secretary Heide Schmidt (Carter 2005: 86; Heinisch 2008: 78–9). Their exodus and further dissent in the party was linked to leadership. In addition to centralizing decision-making within the party, Haider made sure that those in key posts were loyal to him

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17 According to early reports, wrote DeClair (1999: 231), the FN-MN ‘will be much more democratic than the old National Front.’ See also Carter (2005: 85). The name later changed to the National Republican Movement (MNR).
personally; he showed no patience with dissenters and ‘rigidly enforced party discipline’ (Carter 2005: 86). In February 2000, the FPÖ entered a federal government coalition. As government party, FPÖ failed to maintain internal cohesion and experienced a ‘split in the party’ (Ignazi 2003/2006: 255; see also de Lange 2008: 229; Heinisch 2008: 82). Haider, who had resigned as leader in May 2000, mounted a grassroots revolt against the national party leadership at a time of ‘growing dispute within the FPÖ’…’ (Heinisch 2008: 81). FPÖ was beset by ‘severe crises’ – internal conflicts, personal rivalries – and the ‘fundamentalist wing’ of the party, along with Haider, forced the resignation of Susanne Riess-Passer as party leader in the summer of 2002, which ‘seriously damaged’ the party and its ‘credibility’ (Carter 2005: 87). Heinz-Christian Strache, of the party’s Vienna branch, was elected chairman of the rump FPÖ (Heinisch 2008: 81). When Haider and his loyalists left in 2005 the FPÖ split at all levels, ‘resulting in bitter infighting over party resources and identity’ (Heinisch 2008: 81). In Carinthia, Haider pressured nearly the entire local Freedomite branch into joining the new party called Alliance for Austria’s Future (BZÖ) but only there did this new party have ‘a real organization’ (Heinisch 2008: 81).18

While strongly organized and well led, the Belgian/Flemish VB has also experienced factionalism, having had different factions and two main factions (Swyngedouw 1998: 62; Carter 2005: 80, 88–9). There has been a continuing intra-party rift between hard-liners, including right-wing ‘extremists’, and moderates. Dewinter, the former leader, represented the hard-line in the party (Swyngedouw 1998: 62). VB experienced ‘infighting and defections’ in the late 1980s (Carter 2005: 89). But as it turned out this was not that harmful to the party and its organization, rather the contrary insofar as factionalism in the long run ‘appeared to act as an impetus to improve the party’s organization’ (Carter 2005: 88).

In addition to being weakly organized and poorly led, the Wallonian FN is a divided party known for its factionalism in the form of internal conflicts and splits. This is another party that has experienced internal ‘dissent and infighting’ (Carter 2005: 75). Writes Art (2008: 434): ‘It is no exaggeration to say that the FN began to split from the moment of its creation.’ For his part, Coffé (2005: 90–1) notes that the party ‘has always been suffering from splits.’ According to Coffé (2005: 78), the party ‘frequently has to

18 Following Haider’s death in October 2008, Josef Bucher took over as party chairman.
deal with disputes between its officials. These conflicts have already driven
officials to leave the FN and start splinter parties.’

Compared to VB, which has tried to keep right-wing extremists at arms
length, FN has been more prone to right-wing extremism and leading
members of the FN have been convicted of criminal acts (Art 2008: 435). Art
(2008: 436) emphasizes that unlike in Flanders, the FN in Wallonia ‘began from
close to nothing, and the resources that did exist – the militant extremists –
hampared rather than helped party building.’

Italy’s MSI is another factionalized party that ‘suffered from internal
struggles’ (Carter 2005: 82; see also Ignazi 1998). MSI had recognized and
long-lived factions (Ignazi and Ysmal 1998: 293). When Gianfranco Fini
was elected leader, in 1987, it was ‘by a majority which was split into six
factions’ and by 1990 the MSI ‘was a party divided into a multiplicity of
was highly factionalized’ and that ‘the access to the top levels of party
hierarchy involved a strong degree of conflict.’ Likewise, we find AN in
Carter’s group of factionalized parties (Carter 2005: 80).

Bossi’s LN can also be characterized as a factionalized party. Despite its
strong organization and leadership, the party has experienced a number of
time, Bossi’s leadership style ‘acted as a unifying force for the party’
(Carter 2005: 90). For Bossi, ‘tight control over the party was necessary to
prevent the establishment of internal factions that would have weakened
the movement in its struggle against the established parties’ (Betz 1998:
50). In the words of Betz (1998: 51): ‘Democratic centralism and selective
membership recruitment have largely prevented the formation of internal
factions. Those deviating from the party line or challenging Bossi’s leader-
ship were either forced to resign or resigned on their own.’ Nonetheless,
various splits occurred throughout 1999 (Ignazi 2003/2006: 58). But, ac-
cording to Carter (2005: 90), ‘the party’s organizational structure, the se-
lection of its members and the discipline that is enforced throughout the
organization allowed the LN to come through these defections largely un-
scathed.’

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19 In 2005, dissidents from the FN formed another party, the Force Nationale (FNationale)
(Art 2008: 434).
In Scandinavia parties are generally known to be (relatively) cohesive, but the populist ones have shown a tendency toward factionalism. The Progress parties in Denmark and Norway have been divided or factionalized. As Svåsand (1998: 80) argues the lack of cohesion within those two parties as well as Sweden’s NyD can be explained by their sudden appearance; ‘they attracted supporters and activists with very divergent ideas and frequently distaste for regular procedures and decision-making arrangements. Subsequently, it has been a problem for the leadership of these parties to build cohesive parties.’ Svåsand (1998: 82) further notes that the problem of organizational confusion also had to do with their ‘rapid electoral success. This led to an influx of people riding on the coattails of the popular party leaders but also bringing ideas of their own. Thus, the founders had to yield to the influence of the new activists.’

The Danish FRP almost from the beginning was ‘plagued by conflicts’ (Andersen 1992: 195; see also Svåsand 1998: 79). The party has been prone to division or factionalization, and ‘severely hit by internal splits’ (Widfeldt 2000: 489). Carter (2005: 72) notes that its ‘leadership has been chaotic and the level of dissent and factionalism within the party has been high.’ In due course, Glistrup and his adherents were challenged by a faction led by the ‘much more conventional’ – in terms of style – Pia Kjærsgaard, who gradually became the de facto leader of the party (Andersen 1992: 195; see also Sommer and Aagaard 2003). This resulted in a clash between the two factions, centred on Glistrup or Kjærsgaard, culminating at the party conference in September 1995 (Carter 2005: 73). As a result, a breakaway-faction led by Kjærsgaard formed a new party, DF (Svåsand 1998: 81; Andersen and Bjørklund 2000: 197). Widfeldt (2000: 490) suggests that politically ‘there were many similarities’ between the FRP and DF and that ‘much of the difference between them was rooted in personal rivalries.’ He further notes there have been more tensions in the FRP after the split. Regarding DF, we find it in Carter’s set of ‘factionalized’ parties (Carter 2005: 91; see also Rydgren 2004).

When it comes to the Norwegian FrP, this is another factionalized party. It has suffered from internal splits or conflicts and turbulence (Svåsand 1998: 81; Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 259–60). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s there were tensions in the party, centrally and locally. How powerful the central leadership should be was a moot point. There was also an ele-
ment of personal as well as ideological differences. While organizationally ‘normalized’, by 1994, the ideological conflicts within the party remained (Svåsand 1998: 81). At the same time, organizational changes implemented in 1990 left Hagen’s faction in total control of the party’s executive committee and, therefore, Hagen was able to ‘control the majority of his party’ (Svåsand 1998: 81). Hagen and his ‘populist faction’ clearly dominated the party (Carter 2005: 81).

Sweden’s NyD is another party that we find in Carter’s set of ‘divided parties’. Carter (2005: 74) observes that the party experienced ‘ideological divide’, ‘fierce internal struggle’, ‘lack of discipline’, and ‘factionalism’ (see also Taggart 1996; Svåsand 1998; Widfeldt 2000; Svåsand and Wörlund 2005; Rydgren 2006, 2009). The organization succumbed to the political and personal conflicts. Factionalism helps explain why this party failed to institutionalize, and even collapsed. This is in contrast to the Norwegian FrP, which also experienced internal conflicts but managed to build an organization.

Factionalism has also been a characteristic feature of Sweden’s SD, which was formed after a split and has a turbulent history, not uncommon but quite typical for a party such as this. While SD could draw on the organizational experience of the various local parties upon it was established, the extremist character of some of the parties or their members and the notorious infighting within these parties has contributed to internal struggles and defections within the SD. Much has been made of the many disputes and personality conflicts that have existed within the SD (e.g. Larsson and Ekman 2001; Slätt 2004; Widfeldt 2007; Rydgren 2009). Accordingly, it has been classified among (extreme right) parties that are divided (Carter 2005: 67). The party split in the mid-1990s and again in the early 2000s. Like other radical right (populist) parties, the SD has experienced internal divisions between hard-liners and moderates. However, more recent literature on the SD suggests that these conflicts were primarily about power and control of the organization rather than about ideology (Lodenius 2009; Lodenius and Wingborg 2009; Mattsson 2009). The leadership has been anxious to keep extremist/racist elements at a distance and a number of undesirable members and local party representatives have therefore been expelled. Gradually, power slipped away from the Stockholm ‘bunker’ and
faction. As we have seen, power is centralized to the party leader and his small inner circle.

In CEE, top-down elite formations with relatively few members leave less room for factionalization. New parties have been formed and dominated by their leaders, and unquestionable leadership has served to discipline party activists. However, evidence from Poland draws attention to internal conflicts within Self-Defence/SO and the League of Polish Families/LPR (Wysocka 2009). As was noted above SO experienced some ‘internal conflicts’ related to Lepper’s leadership (Wysocka 2009: 172). During the fourth parliamentary term (2001–2005) constant conflict was noticeable inside the SO either because of opposition to party chairman Andrzej Lepper’s ‘autocratic style of leadership’ or to party policy; as a result, 23 members left or were expelled from the parliamentary group during those years (Wysocka 2009: 153). The weakness in the organizational structure was resolved by ‘disciplining incoming members’ (Wysocka 2009: 153).

Inside the LPR, despite its electoral success, there were also ‘internal conflicts’ (Wysocka 2009: 183). There were ‘two factions’ inside the party, one moderate centrist and one fundamentalist (Wysocka 2009: 183).

In summary, populist parties have proved to be prone to internal divisions or intra-party factionalism. This also follows a pattern, as I will elaborate in the conclusion below.
Conclusion

This report has explored how parties classified as populist organize and to what extent they are alike and distinctive in their organization, whether or not they have intrinsic organizational characteristics, and serves to advance this research agenda. As noted in the introduction organization has been identified as a lacuna in existing research on populist political parties, and systematic research on organizational factors has been sparse hitherto. Organization is one of the least studied aspects of these parties and remains under-researched. Setting out to redress this situation, this report fills part of this research gap.

Based on the scattered secondary evidence, we can conclude that the parties under examination have experienced remarkably similar organizational structure and development, despite contingent factors and considerable variation in historical and institutional legacies and contexts. I have found ample evidence to support the claim that populist parties – as a group and invariably it seems – share characteristic features in organizational terms.

A clear pattern has emerged. In a broad comparative perspective, three patterns are particularly notable as regards the organization of populist parties. First, across the line, centralized organizational structures stand out as a prominent characteristic feature of the parties. This study finds that these parties are usually hierarchical organizations dominated from the top. We find extensive support for the expectation that power is concentrated in the hands of a small group or ‘coterie’ of leaders or even of one single leader. These leaders, it seems, create a sort of unitary command and control structure where all roads lead directly to them. A central component of this power concentration is the authority conferred on the party leader,
directly authorized to make decisions binding on the party itself. The French FN is not the only case where the authority and resources to coordinate policy appear to belong to the leader or to a small clique of leaders in the executive committee. Rather, this seems to be a general trend in these parties. In all of the cases under examination, without exception, even in Sweden, with its strong egalitarian norms, there has been a tendency toward centralization. This pattern has been reinforced by the tendency for especially radical right populist parties to be factionalized or divided. Such parties need a central locus of power. More specifically, when it comes to populism and its parties ‘centralized leadership is essential since it dovetails with demands for an unmediated link between the leader and the people’ (Zaslove 2008: 323).

There is a paradox here. Whereas populist parties tend to be ‘anti-system’, ‘anti-establishment’, and even ‘anti-party’ by calling attention to the allegedly low degree of systemic democracy between political parties, those very same populist parties apparently have only limited democracy within their own organization. Inasmuch as populist political party organizations are established top down and are dominated by their leaders there is limited room for internal democracy.

The second pattern, and linked to the former, is personalized (and centralized) leadership. As many of the populist parties in question usually are younger organizations they are likely to be less institutionalized than older parties and more dependent upon one or a few individuals (Mudde 2007: 273). Personalized leadership is often but not always based on charismatic authority. Many populist forces predictably form around a charismatic personality. A case in point is the French FN under Le Pen. DeClair (1999: 215) argues that this party ‘was singularly dependent on Le Pen’s leadership skills. This follows a rather general pattern for parties of the far right; historically, such parties have tended to coalesce around authoritarian leaders, and in our discussion of the Austrian, Belgian/Flemish, and Italian contemporary far right we noted similar patterns of charismatic leadership.’ Other charismatic leaders include Haider and Fortuyn. But here the picture is more mixed. Whereas most of the parties seem to have experienced charismatic leadership, all parties have not really followed this broader trend. SD is a conspicuous exception to this rule. Charismatic-type of leadership quite clearly does not apply in this case. While SD has also experienced a
tendency towards personalized rather than collegial leadership it cannot be characterized as charismatic leadership. But SD is rather the exception that proves the rule – populist parties tend to have ‘charismatic’ leaders and depend on them. This also follows a rather general pattern for populist parties.

The third pattern is factionalism or intra-party division. For example, the French FN split into warring factions and even into a splinter party. In particular, extreme right parties are prone to internal conflicts, strife, and splits. As we have seen a divided far right is not a new phenomenon but instead characteristic for these parties, which tend to be riven by infighting and personal rivalries.

The findings suggest that populist parties tend to have centralized, personalized, leader-dependent, and factionalized organizations. This commonality is really interesting because it is partly at odds with what has been claimed in scholarship on these parties. The work of a number of scholars suggests that populist parties have weak organizations. Populist parties are known to have particularly weak and shallow organizations, with a simpler structure than other parties. Indeed, they are expected to exhibit a greater propensity towards ‘light’ organization than other parties, particularly on the left. However, temporal changes uncover a degree of organizational complexity that is surprising given that the literature on populist parties points towards organizational weakness. Far from all populist parties have weak or ‘light’ organizations. Parties like the FN in France, the Belgian VB, FPÖ in Austria, Denmark’s DF, and the FrP in Norway have all built up solid organizations. Parties are gradually developing their organizations. As they grow and mature the parties evolve and are gaining increasing organizational complexity.

While distancing themselves from ‘party democracy’ and representative institutions and claiming to be different than other parties, populist parties still need politics and to organize. If they are to present themselves as a credible actor to the electorate, perform well, endure, and avoid being a ‘flash’ phenomenon, to make an impact, perhaps even to assume power, populist parties too need to build and develop organizational structures and capacities. Invariably, political parties face the challenge of organization building. To some extent, all parties are in need of a core (activist) cadre.
At the same time, however, there is variance in terms of strength and institutionalization of party organizations. There are divergent trajectories and variations – spatial as well as temporal – to examine and explain (Mudde 2007: 267; see also Ellinas 2007, 2010). Further research is needed to clarify more precisely how parties evolve. In consideration of inter-temporal dynamics, how do these parties develop across time? Are they becoming institutionalized? Is there resistance to institutionalization and what types of organization emerge? Is the personalization weakened over time and replaced with a more balanced and democratic structure? These questions invite additional research.

The findings of this report may form the basis for inquiries into variation in populist political party organization across time, space, and parties. There is a need for systematic, empirical and comparative study of populist parties in a larger set of European countries, in Europe West and East. Research on populist parties has tended to be confined to West European party systems; more study of populist parties elsewhere would also enrich and extend the generality of theory on party development.

Although there is little question that populist parties vary among themselves, additional work is needed to assess more fully the distinctiveness of the (new) populist parties from other and older parties. Populist parties are not ‘all alike.’ Any two parties within the same party family have distinctive features and vary among themselves, for example in the detailed structure of their organization.

It might be argued that the three patterns outlined above are characteristic but not distinctive or unique features of populist parties. Centralized organization and personalized leadership are typical but not distinctive features of populist parties, including the new radical right. Rather, this seems to be a general trend in parties. Other parties are centralized and personalized as well. More generally, parties seem to become increasingly leader-centred or leader-driven. In an age of personality politics, party leaders become natural foci of media attention and often reinforce this development themselves by cultivating personal images tailored for mass media. Yet, it appears as if populist parties have generally an elitist organizational style and have paid less attention to issues of internal party democracy.
An area in which additional research is needed concerns the transnational dimension of populism and parties, which increasingly operate at the interface between the national and the European or international. We may hypothesize that the similar patterns of organization in part can be linked to diffusion, imitation and institutional modelling or transfer on a transnational scale. To what extent do parties model themselves after parties in other countries?

In conclusion, this report carries two broader implications. First, it suggests that there are important commonalities at work. Second, this report opens up a new agenda of research. As the first systematic exploration of populist political party organization, it offers an initial rather than a final analysis. Additional work will have to be done on many individual parties as well as comparatively to enhance our knowledge and understanding of populism and its parties.
References


