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15

Jan

2025

State Propaganda and Pro-war Consensus in Russia

The Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) is announcing a call for contributions to a workshop that delves into the role of state propaganda in crafting pro-war consensus in Russia.

Introduction

The consolidation of Russian society around support for the Russo-Ukrainian war has often been attributed, besides other factors, to the proliferation of propaganda through co-opted by the regime media environment (Litvinenko, 2022). Discussing the role of media in pro-war mobilisation, journalists and researchers often point to so-called hard propaganda, characterized by overt, crude, and heavy-handed messaging disseminated primarily through news media (Olenik, 2023; Geissler et al., 2023; Fortuin, 2023).
However, scholars noted a paradox when analysing TV news perception in Russia: the propaganda message is often reproduced by individuals who either do not watch TV or express distrust in it (Alyukov, 2022; Szostek, 2018). Concurrently, scholars also question the efficiency of hard propaganda reporting. It signals to citizens the regime's power rather than convinces them (Huang, 2018; Lutscher, 2024; Wedeen, 1999). As Ellyul (1962) mentioned, to persuade individuals, propaganda should be promoted not only through mass media but also in most aspects of everyday life, e.g., education, cultural events, and religion.
Additionally, the audience does not always keep up with political agenda through news, but often through infotainment and entertainment content where political narratives are implicitly embedded into the message (Fuchs, 2018; Mattingly and Yao, 2022). Researchers designate such content as soft propaganda (Mattingly and Yao, 2022; Zou, 2021) that is based both on aesthetics and rhetoric (Adorno, 1946; Malmberg, 2023;) and often appeals to the attractiveness of specific views, values, and lifestyles (Zou, 2021). The analysis of soft propaganda has been primarily undertaken in such fields as cultural studies and sociology, whereas only recently gained attention in political communication research.

To understand the functioning of propaganda and its role in forming a pro-war consensus in Russia, it is crucial to analyse various forms of propaganda as mutually reinforcing strategies employed by the state to entrench a certain ideology within the population.

The goal of this workshop is twofold. Firstly, it aims to analyse various forms of propaganda to reconstruct the ideological environment that impacts individuals daily. Secondly, it strives to define reoccurring narrative structures in different forms of propaganda.

Proposed research topics of the workshop

Submissions from multiple fields, such as media studies, cultural studies, and sociology, addressing the following topics are welcome:

  • Hard propaganda in mass media, its efficiency and perception.
  • Soft propaganda on media and the role of social media influencers in the propagation of pro-regime narratives.
  • Soft propaganda through cultural production - in movies, music, art and various cultural activities.
  • Religious actors - as agents of soft propaganda.
  • Consumption of patriotic brands as elements of soft propaganda.
  • Education and propaganda.

Submit your proposals through the online application form - see the button below.

  • Deadline for application: 20 November 2024
  • Notification of acceptance: 2 December 2024
  • Registration deadline for non-presenting participants in the workshop: 17 December 2024 (use the link to the application form below)
  • The event takes place on 15 January 2025
  • Form of event: onsite with obligatory registration
  • A number of travel grants are available to cover transport and accommodation costs.

For more details, please contact: spr2024@sh.se

Time and place

15 January 2025, 08:00-16:00

Workshop

Obligatory registration

English

Arranged by

Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Södertörn University

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Page updated

01-11-2024