How Russian propaganda targets Ukraine’s home front resilience

In “How Has Russian Propaganda Changed during the War? A Long-Term Battle against Ukrainian Statehood” Alyona Hurkivska, PhD in political science at Södertörn University, argues that Russian propaganda has shifted its focus towards destabilisation strategies, undermining Ukrainian morale and faith in victory.

– Before 24 February 2022, the examined channels predominantly worked to normalise pro-Russian interpretations of Ukrainian politics and the war itself, advancing frameworks such as the notions of “external control” and “Ukraine’s culpability for the war”. After the invasion, as is typical of wartime disinformation, Telegram channels crafted narratives intended to undermine Ukrainian morale on the home front, sow discord, and erode the collective will to resist, as this analysis also shows, says Alyona Hurkivska.

The study analyses content from five pro-Russian Telegram channels that claim to be Ukrainian. It focuses on their content from 2019, following the election of President Volodymyr Zelenskyi, until 2024. Investigated Telegram channels were identified by the Security Service of Ukraine as outlets disseminating Russian propaganda. All five publish in Russian and frequently comment on Ukrainian domestic politics, often claiming access to exclusive “insider” information.

Collectively, the channels promote narratives designed to erode trust in Ukraine’s Western partners and to demobilise Ukrainian society. Messages suggest that resistance to Russia is futile, that betrayal within Ukraine is widespread, and that the country is being externally controlled and coerced into war. The Ukrainian state is portrayed as weak, isolated, and lacking strategic agency.

– The study used an ethnographic approach to content analysis (Altheide, 1987), coding narratives extracted from selected posts. The coding process was inductive and involved identifying patterns, propaganda techniques, and key topics that emerged from the data. The interpretation was guided by an ethnographic understanding of Ukraine’s political context. For example, a message regarding “corrupted authorities” was interpreted as propaganda when it aligned with a broader subnarrative of a “failed state” that appeared repeatedly across other posts, says Alyona Hurkivska.

Impact of propaganda

Despite the scale and persistence of these narratives, Alyona Hurkivska cautions against assuming they have been broadly effective. The resilience of democratic beliefs, episodes of public mobilisation to protect institutions (particularly anti-corruption institutions), and support for European integration indicate that the Ukrainian society at large does not passively absorb these messages.

At the same time, Alyona Hurkivska notes that more research is needed to understand how effectively such propaganda is at achieving its goals, who the actual audience is, and how much propaganda influence the audience’s psychological state.

“How Has Russian Propaganda Changed during the War? A Long-Term Battle against Ukrainian Statehood” is published in the December 2025 issue of Ukrainian Analytical Digest External link, opens in new window..