Stina Bäckström is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Senior Lecturer at the Centre for studies in practical knowledge at Södertörn University. She has a PhD in philosophy from the University of Chicago. She works in the field of philosophy of mind and action, as well as virtue ethics. She has written on topics such as expression, self-consciousness, skill, and the human/animal divide. Her ongoing research concerns issues in speech act theory and virtue ethical perspectives on humor. Stina's work is eclectic but often takes its point of departure in thinkers such as Aristotle, Elizabeth Anscombe, Stanley Cavell, John McDowell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Stina has a Humboldt Research Fellowship at the Institut für Philosophie at Leipzig University starting in the fall of 2024.
Selected Publications in English:
“Must Expression be Instrumental”, Organon F, 28 (2): 282–302, 2021.
“Spontaneous Expression and Intentional Action”, Inquiry, 2020, DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1822910 External link.
“A Dogma of Speech Act Theory”, Inquiry, 2020, DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1724563 External link.
“’Modes of a Complicated Form of Life’: Expression and Human-Animal Continuity”. Wittgenstein and Naturalism, eds. Cahill and Raleigh, Routledge, 2018: 223-240.
“Skill, Drill, and Intelligent Performance: Ryle and Intellectualism” (with Martin Gustafsson). Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 5/5, 2017: 41-55.
“What is it to Depsychologize Psychology?” European Journal of Philosophy, 25 (2), 2017, 358–375
“Expression and Self-Consciousness,” Philosophical Topics, 44 (1), 2016, pp. 161-180.
“A Dilemma for Neo-Expressivism—And How to Resolve it,” Acta Analytica, 31(2), 2016, 191-205.
“Review of Alice Crary’s Inside Ethics,” Nordic Wittgenstein Review, 5/1, 2016: 131-138.
“Our Relation to Our Own Expressions: Comment on Bar-On, Green, and Finkelstein,” Analytic Philosophy, 4/54, 2013: 466-476.
The researcher is not participating in any projects at this moment.